If you want to know what’s really going on, don’t pay attention to political speeches or news headlines. Look instead at any underlying reallocation of power — who’s gaining power and who’s losing it — and ponder what these changes mean for the future.
Consider, for example, three big upcoming stories this week:
The Glasgow climate summit will generate lots of verbiage. But the real question is whether Biden can convince other nations’ political leaders they can trust the United States to do its part. This will be a huge task given Trump’s abandonment of the Paris climate accord, Joe Manchin’s (and oil and coal companies’) recent influence whittling back Biden’s climate agenda, and Friday’s decision by the Supreme Court to hear a case brought by coal companies and 18 Republican-led states to rein in the power of the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate carbon emissions. As to this last point, foreign leaders will note that although the Biden administration had asked the court to delay hearing the case until the EPA finished crafting new carbon emission guidelines, the court rejected the request and decided to hear it anyway.
So what does this tell us about the real allocation of power in America as it affects climate change? That power still lies with coal (and oil). Hopefully, this will change, but only if we keep pressure on lawmakers and corporations to move toward a green economy. (Maybe we should also threaten to increase the number of seats on the current retrograde Supreme Court, but that’s a discussion for another day.)
Tuesday’s Virginia gubernatorial election is being called a “bellwether” for the midterms. That’s simplistic. Almost no one outside Virginia and Washington, D.C. cares whether Democrat Terry McAuliffe or Republican Glenn Youngkin prevails. Its real significance lies in its effects on two groups of people who will have disproportionate power over the midterm elections: (1) campaign advisors for midterm candidates, especially in “purple” states, who are watching to see whether McAuliffe’s attempts to tie Youngkin to Trump are more effective than Youngkin’s attempts to tie McAuliffe to Biden, and will tailor their messages accordingly; and (2) corporate political operatives, who will channel somewhat more money to Republican candidates in the midterms if Youngkin wins and vice versa if McAuliffe is victorious. (Note that they channeled record amounts of money to Biden and Democrats in the 2020 general election relative to Trump and the GOP, so they’re almost inevitably recalibrating anyway.)
A power shift? Too early to tell, but keep your eyes fixed on the message machines in both parties. And keep following the big money.
Biden’s social-climate package is the third issue I’m watching this week. The media has fashioned this as a showdown between progressive Democrats and moderates. Rubbish. It’s Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema versus every other Democratic senator and most House Democrats. What’s the endgame? Democrats will come to some agreement — if not this week then soon — because the political costs of failing to do so are just too high given next year’s the midterm elections. But the final result will almost certainly disappoint the progressive wing of the party, which will have to accept far less than it wanted.
What does this mean for power in the Democratic Party? The danger is that progressives — who have emerged as the most activist part of party — could feel discouraged from making as strong a grass-roots effort in 2022 as they did in 2020, weakening the Party’s prospects while strengthening the hand of the establishment wing (CEOs, big-money operatives, and the wealthy). What will Biden do to avoid this? He could try making it up to progressives by pushing mightily for voting rights. But to do this, he’ll need to get all Democratic senators to agree to carve out voting rights from the filibuster. Once again, Manchin and Sinema will be critical.
Hope you find this helpful.
The Week Ahead: Power politics in Glasgow, Virginia, and Washington