Thx, John. I figure that with any complicated piece of aviation the problem is the combination of technical incompetence as well as the bottom line. BTW, I was reading a news article this morning about Airbus, in which their CEO said that they're aware that they could be circling the safety perception drain just like Boeing. Just waiting…
Thx, John. I figure that with any complicated piece of aviation the problem is the combination of technical incompetence as well as the bottom line. BTW, I was reading a news article this morning about Airbus, in which their CEO said that they're aware that they could be circling the safety perception drain just like Boeing. Just waiting for an incident to hit the news. I seem to recall one of AirBus' newish planes in the late 90s losing an entire vertical fin on takeoff because of a defect in the carbon fiber layup.
I was not aware of the Airbus comments. Thank you Winslow. When the Max issue first occurred, the first place I searched for info was from Seattle based reporters who knew their stuff. What I learned was that at the time, even the Boeing engineering team saw fit to allow a single angle of attack sensor via their Failure Mode and Effects Analysis review (FMEA). The MCAS flight pitch system, that was brand new and not known to those flying said planes for commercial companies, was then reliant on a single angle of attack sensor, that if failed or giving wrong readings to maintain flight pitch. Well, the only problem was, such sensors can fail or give inaccurate readings. That a supposedly skilled team of engineers would not ask themselves, what could go wrong if that single sensor didn’t function properly? A simple low cost backup that wasn’t employed. I confirmed this with Ed Pierson, a former Boeing manager and Max whistleblower.
Yep, and one of my cousins, recently retired after at least 40 years with boeing, was one of the multitude of engineers there in Seattle. An EE, I gave him some ribbing about that 1979 or so hard landing on a roadway of a 737 outside Manchester, England when the instruments indicated a fire in one engine but the crew shut down the working engine because the installers had wired the left indicator to the right sensor and vice versa. Build problems are not new.
Thx, John. I figure that with any complicated piece of aviation the problem is the combination of technical incompetence as well as the bottom line. BTW, I was reading a news article this morning about Airbus, in which their CEO said that they're aware that they could be circling the safety perception drain just like Boeing. Just waiting for an incident to hit the news. I seem to recall one of AirBus' newish planes in the late 90s losing an entire vertical fin on takeoff because of a defect in the carbon fiber layup.
I was not aware of the Airbus comments. Thank you Winslow. When the Max issue first occurred, the first place I searched for info was from Seattle based reporters who knew their stuff. What I learned was that at the time, even the Boeing engineering team saw fit to allow a single angle of attack sensor via their Failure Mode and Effects Analysis review (FMEA). The MCAS flight pitch system, that was brand new and not known to those flying said planes for commercial companies, was then reliant on a single angle of attack sensor, that if failed or giving wrong readings to maintain flight pitch. Well, the only problem was, such sensors can fail or give inaccurate readings. That a supposedly skilled team of engineers would not ask themselves, what could go wrong if that single sensor didn’t function properly? A simple low cost backup that wasn’t employed. I confirmed this with Ed Pierson, a former Boeing manager and Max whistleblower.
Yep, and one of my cousins, recently retired after at least 40 years with boeing, was one of the multitude of engineers there in Seattle. An EE, I gave him some ribbing about that 1979 or so hard landing on a roadway of a 737 outside Manchester, England when the instruments indicated a fire in one engine but the crew shut down the working engine because the installers had wired the left indicator to the right sensor and vice versa. Build problems are not new.